摘要
過去經理人薪酬的研究多基於代理理論進行探討，本研究則考量公平理論與社會相對論，分析經理人相對薪酬與研發密度間的關係，本研究以縱橫資料（panel data）進行實證。結果顯示，薪酬偏高的經理人多會增加研發投入，以提昇未來的潛在獲利，其心理方得平衡。電子業受到外界關注，其經理人之薪酬若偏離市場行情時，因受到市場壓力，其行事較為謹慎，多不會調整研發支出。相對的，在經理人控制的企業中，較缺乏制約機制，其經理人調整研發支出較為強烈。再者，當經理人薪酬偏高時，若股東權益報酬率嚴重下滑，則經理人多會裁減研發支出，以避免獲利重挫，保住工作。這意味著，不符市場行情的薪資恐左右員工內心的滿足感，其對經理人之決策行為具關鍵性之影響。
關鍵詞：經理人相對薪酬、研發密度、高科技產業、經理人控制的企業、股東權益報酬率重挫 Abstract
In the past, most research on CEO compensation was conducted based on agency theory. In this study, equity theory and social relativism were explored, and the relationship between CEOs’ overpayment and R&D density was also discussed and analyzed. This study was conducted by adopting panel data as empirical evidence. The results showed that managers with relatively higher compensation would mostly increase their R&D investment to increase their potential profits in the future and to achieve their psychological balance. The results also showed that in the electronics industry under concern, managers would behave relatively more cautiously under market pressure when their compensation deviated from market quotations, and mostly would not adjust their research expenditures. The enterprises under managerial control would relatively lack disciplinary mechanisms, and their mangers would have a stronger tendency to adjust research expenditures. Moreover, the managers with higher compensation would mostly cut research spending to prevent a significant drop in profits and to keep their jobs in the event of a severe drop in return on equity (ROE). This meant that the compensation greatly deviating from market quotations would affect employee satisfaction, which played a crucial role in managers’ policy-making. Keywords: Manager Overpayment, R&D Density, the High-tech Industry, the Firms Controlled by the Manager, a Serious Decline in ROE